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INNOVATIONS DISGUISED AS
TRADITIONS: A HISTORICAL
REVIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT
NOMINATIONS PROCESS
Ronald D. Rotunda*
Ronald Rotunda, the Albert Jenner Professor of Law at the
University of Illinois, may be best known for his work in constitutional law. He has published the definitive multivolume treatise in that field along with his colleague John Nowak, as well
as a casebook and a variety of articles. His stature in the field
has been confirmed by his early election to the American Law
Institute and his citations in the opinions of the Supreme Court.
Professor Rotunda also teaches and writes in the field of legal
ethics and is a leader of that generation of scholars who took up
the field in the wake of the Watergate scandal. Perhaps most
important for all who admire him, Professor Rotunda is himself
a profoundly honest and ethical individual who often works behind the scenes on projects-like the Rededication of the Law
School-to improve the stature of the College of Law.**
President Clinton's consideration of various candidates to replace
Justices White and Blackmun consumed almost as much newsprint as
his search for an attorney general. Given the age of some of the Justices, it would not be surprising if the President will have the opportunity to fill another vacancy before the end of his four-year term. We
expect the media to report thoroughly on his possible choices, and rumors of his choices, long before he makes the actual nomination. Supreme Court appointments were not always such newsworthy events.
The presidential and senatorial appointment process has changed
much over the last two centuries, and recent innovations are often
wrongly thought to be old traditions.
Appointment to the Supreme Court gives the recipient a very
prestigious job, a powerful position, indoor work, no heaving lifting.
While some things never change (the job is still indoors with no heav* Albert E. Jenner, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. A.B. 1967,
Harvard College; J.D. !970, Harvard Law School.
** This abstract is a reprint of Professor James E. Pfander's introductory remarks.
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ing lifting), the position did not start off as either particularly powe
ful or prestigious, and so people often turned it down. 1 It was 0 ,
uncommon in the early years for nominees to decline the honor, or 1
resign to take better jobs in the state judiciary,' or for Presidents 1
nominate a political opponent simply to get him out of the picture.
In grade school we learned that President Adams chose Jot
Marshall to be the young nation's fourth Chief Justice. But fewer per
pie recall that Marshall was Adams's third or fourth choice• It w1
not unusual in those days to decline a position on the Supreme Cou
or to resign soon after appointment. By the time of Marshall's confi
mation in 1801, the six-member Court had had ten individuals fill tl
five places reserved for Associate Justice, and four people had fill<
the one place reserved for Chief Justice.'
Washington, for example, nominated Robert Hanson Harrison
the first Court, but he rejected the honor in order to become ChancE
lor of Maryland. 6 Then Washington turned to James Iredell (thirt

l. Senator George Mitchell was reported to have withdrawn from consideration when Pn
dent Clinton considered the vacancy created when Justice Blackmun retired. The news repo
suggested various reasons. Senate Majority Leader Mitchell, who retired from the U.S. Senate
1994, at the end of his term, expbined that he wanted to focus his energies on passing comprel1(
sive health care reform. However, whatever the reasons, it is dear that Mitchell did not withdr
from consideration on the ground that the job was not important enough.
2. John Rutledge, for example, resigned in 1791 so that he could become Chief Justice
the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas and Sessions. 4 RONALD D RoTUNDA & JOHN
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE app. at 767 (2d
1992).
3. When Postmaster General McLean objected to President Jackson's attempt to use
postal service for political purposes, Jackson "kicked McLean upstairs, which reveals something
the manner in which the court was regarded even as late as Jackson's time." CoRTEZ AM E
JNG, THE JL:oGES OF THE SUPREME COURT. 1789-1937: A STUDY OF THE!R QUALIFICATIONS 92
n.3 (1938).
4. 2 GEORGE L. HASKINS, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE :
l'REME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UJ>;ITED STAl
FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, !801-15, at 7 (Paul A. Freund cd., !98!).
Adams first appointed John Jay, who was then ending his term as Governor of New York,
the position of Chief Justice. The Senate quickly confirmed him, but Jay refused the appointm
anyway. Adams then considered Justice Cushing (and apparently Paterson after Cushing); b
Cushing and Paterson were already on the Supreme Court, and Adams began to question the i+
of appointing from within the Court, which would require him to make another appointment to
the vacancy that he would have created by the internal promotion. Adams then turned to M
shall. After that, some people tried to persuade Adams to replace Marshall's nomination \1
Paterson's, but Adams refused. The Senate, on January 27, 180\, unanimously confirmed M
shall. !d. at 103-04.
5. The four people who had filled the position for Chief Justice, by the time of Marshf
confirmation, were Jay, Rutledge, Ellsworth, and Marshall.
The ten people who had filled the five places reserved for Associate Justice, by the timet
Marshall had been confirmed, were Blair, Cushing, Rutledge, Wilson, Johnson, Iredell, Paten
Chase, Washington, and Moore. 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 2, app. at 759.
6. Some secondary sources claim that Harrison decided to reject the appointment so
because of his ill health. However, he did accept the state appointment, notwithstanding
health, and when he wrote Washington on October 27, 1789, he did not rely on that exc1
Instead, he offered these reasons:
Should I accept the appointment, I should be constrained to take the more unfavourabl
residence ['the seat of government,' then in New York]. The number of my family has bee
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eight years old), who accepted but died nine short years later in
1799. 7 Our first Chief Justice, John Jay (who was only forty-four
years old when appointed), resigned six years later to become Governor of New York. John Rutledge, whom George Washington appointed in 1789, never actually sat with the Court and resigned in
1791. Washington made him the young nation's second Chief Justice
in 1795, but he left the recess appointment later that year when the
Senate rejected him. The following year, after one of his choices declined to serve, Washington appointed Senator Oliver Ellsworth as
Chief Justice. In 1799, Ellsworth became ambassador to France, and
the following year he also resigned from the Court. 8
Nowadays, the health of a nominee would be considered quite
relevant, but that was not always so. When President Washington
chose candidates to the U.S. Supreme Court, he did not bother to
make any inquiries into health. We now know that many of his
choices were of poor health, yet they accepted. Jay, for example, had
rheumatism; Blair complained of an inner ear problem that was so
distracting that it eventually caused him to resign; Cushing developed
a growth on his lip; Chase and Ellsworth both had the gout and renal
stones• It would be unheard of for a present-day candidate to refuse
to share relevant medical data with the Senate Judiciary Committee,
but Washington never even asked his nominees about their health.
Geographic diversity also used to be very important in the selection process. When President Madison sought a replacement for Justice Cushing of Massachusetts, he turned to Joseph Story only after
Levi Lincoln-and then John Quincy Adams-declined the invita-

encreased [sic] by the unfortunate event of a Brother's death, and I consider myself under an
indispensable necessity of attending to the affairs of his Children, as their friend and Guard~
ian~·both for their interest and for my own indemnity. These considerations, Sir, and one
more, of still greater weight,-a distrust of my competency to the arduous & exalted Sta*
tion . . . . . .and the persuasion that my not accepting, will not be a matter of public detriment,
induce me to determine that I cannot but decline the appointment.
Letter from Robert H. Harrison to George Washington (OcL 27, 1789), reprinted in I DocuMEN-

TARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE Ul\'ITED STATES, 1779~1800, pt. I, at 38 (Maeva
Marcus et al. eds., 1985) [hereinafter DocuMENTARY HISTORY].
During his life, Harrison declined a lot of appointments, even when in good health. In 1785,
long before his death, he declined a congressional appointment to decide a land dispute. In 1787,
he even refused to be one of Maryland's delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787. !d. at
33. On health issues, see infra text accompanying note 9.
7. Iredell stopped attending Court sessions starting with the August 1799 Term of the
Court. See H.G. Connor, James Iredell: Lawyer, Statesman, Judge, 60 U PENN. L REV. 225, 252
(1912). But Iredell did not die until some months later, apparently on October 10, 1799. Surprisingly, no formal notification exists of the death of James Iredell. See DocuMENTARY HtsTORY,
supra note 6, at 68.
8. See 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 2, § l.2(a)-(b).
9. 1 JULiUS GOEBEL JR., THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT Of THE UNITED STATES
FOUNDATIONS OF POWER ANTECEDENTS AND BEGrNNINGS TO 1801, at 553 & n.8 (Paul A.
Freund ed., 1971).
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tion. 10 All three individuals were residents of Massachusetts. That was
no accident, because Madison insisted that the nominee be from a
New England state. It is only quite recently that Presidents have, with
regularity, ignored the custom of geographic diversity 11
Until modern times, it was unusual for two Justices to come from
the same state, 12 but the news media paid little attention to that fact
in 1981, when President Reagan appointed Justice O'Connor even
though both she and Justice Rehnquist were residents of Arizona.
When President Clinton replaced Justice White, he considered, but
ultimately did not appoint, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt-even though he, like Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor, hails from Arizona. Bruce Babbitt's name was again mentioned as being on the short list of candidates who might replace Justice Blackmun. Although the President did not choose him, the fact
that he would have been the third Justice from the same state did not
appear to have been a stumbling block. 13 Nowadays, the simple fact is
that geographic diversity and state residency are less important to
people than other types of diversity, mainly race and sex, and perhaps
religion. (For many years, commentators referred to a "Jewish seat"
on the Court.)
As the Court has become more powerful, the nature of the confirmation hearing has also changed. To say that the earlier hearings
were not as elaborate and public as today is, to say the least, an understatement. For example, on September 4, 1922, Justice John Hessin Clarke resigned from the Supreme Court. The next day President
Harding nominated his successor, George Sutherland, and the Senate
confirmed the lifetime appointment later that very same day." In
fact, for over a third of a century, from 1894 until 1930, the Senate
never rejected a nominee, although there were some bitter confirma-

10.

Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Joseph Story: A Man for All Seasons, in !990

JOURNAL OF SCPREME COURT HISTORY. YEARBOOK OF THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCI-

ETY 17 (1990).
11. E.g., GOEBEL, supra note 9, at 553 (pointing out that "proper geographic distribution of
the posts" on the Supreme Court started with President Washington).
12. A rare exception was Hoover's third appointmcnt-Cardozo from New York-although
Justice Stone and Chief Justice Hughes were also from New York. Cardozo replaced Holmes of
Massachusetts. The circumstances were unusuaL Hoover, in 1932, was politically very weak, and
Cardozo was very popular, someone who could get readily confirmed. The Senate approved him
unanimously. See Ira H. Carmen, The President, Politics and the Power of Appointment: Hoover's Nomination of Mr. Justice Cardozo, 55 VA. L REV. 616 (l969).
Cardozo's nomination was "a violation of the long standing tradition that the membership of
the Court represent as wide a geographic base as possible." !d. at 6!6. It was important that
Senator Borah of Idaho supported Cardozo, even though Hoover was thinking of naming a westerner to the Court.
13. The President nominated, and the Senate confirmed, Judge Stephen G. Breyer of the
First Circuit, a resident of Massachusetts.
14. 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 2, § 2.7, at 109.
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tion f1ghts.'" A modern president never would assume that Senate
confirmation is assured. Yet, until quite recently, the Senate confirmation process was usually brief. For example, in 1969, the Democraticdominated Senate confirmed Warren Burger only nineteen days after
President Nixon had nominated him."
Until 1929, the Senate had a rule that all nominations would be
considered in executive session unless two-thirds of the senators voted
otherwise. Over the years, as the media began to look at nominees
more actively, the Senate began to reconsider its policy of conducting
confirmation hearings and debates on the Senate floor in private. In
1929, the Senate changed its policy so that now the default rule is
public debate unless a majority votes otherwise. 17 Before that, this
century saw open debate only in the very public and extended debate
over Justice Brandeis (in which the opposition laced its rejection of his
social activism with extensive anti-Semitic rhetoric) 18 and in the controversy over the nomination of Justice Stone.
The Stone controversy is interesting because it marked the first
time in history that a Supreme Court nominee ever personally appeared before the Senate Committee considering the confirmation of
the nominee. Until that time, the nominee might send telegrams or
other written communications to the Committee in order to respond to
issues, but the nominee himself would not appear. Even Justice Brandeis did not appear personally to respond to ethics and other charges
(though he did have an informal dinner meeting with two senators
who had doubts about his nomination).'" Until the Stone nomination,
if a candidate did ask to appear in person, the Committee would simply deny the request. 20
The Stone appointment changed all that. The circumstances were
unusual. Coolidge nominated Stone on January 25, 1925, and the
Senate Judiciary Committee approved him unanimously. As was the
custom, Stone did not appear before the Committee. Then, Senator

15. The confirmation battle over Justice Brandeis, see infra note 18 and accompanying text,
had the characteristics of a major political campaign. See Paul A. Freund, Appointment of Jus~
tices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV L. REV. 1146, 1151 (1988). Professor Freund told
me some years ago that when the media spends a lot less attention on Supreme Court nominees,
that will be a sign that civilization has progressed.
16. Nina Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to Know,
101 HARV L REV 1213, 1214 (1988).
17. Freund, supra note 15, at 1157.
18.

See, e.g.,

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, 9 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY

OF THE SUPREME COCRT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT. 1910-21, at 357-92 (Paul A. Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds., 1984); John P. Frank, The
Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN_ L REV. 683 (1965).
19. ALPHEUS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 503-04 (1946).
20. See John P. Frank, The Appointment of Supreme Court Justices: Prestige, Principles,
and Politics, 1941 WIS. L. REV. 172, 200-10.
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Burton K. Wheeler of Montana objected strenuously and persuaded
the Senate to recommit the nomination to the Committee.
Wheeler claimed that Stone, while Attorney General, should
have dismissed an allegedly improper indictment that Stone's predecessor had brought against Wheeler. Stone asked to be heard in person to defend his action, and the Committee accepted. Stone limited
his responses to this one issue, the Committee once again approved
him, and the Senate then confirmed him, with both Montana Senators
abstaining''
After the Stone nomination, the Senate went back to the tradition of not calling the nominees to testify. Hoover's nominee, Judge
Parker of the Fourth Circuit, asked the Senate Committee to allow
him to respond in person to charges that he was antilabor and racist,
but the Senate denied that request, only allowed written responses, 22
rejected him, and then confirmed Hoover's second choice, Owen
Roberts.
The hearing process began to change more dramatically during
the New Deal. When Roosevelt nominated Senator Hugo Black in
1937, the Senate, for the first time in a half century, decided to hold
hearings on a senator. Before that, if the nominee was a senator, the
Senate tradition had been to hold no hearings and confirm immediately. Still, Hugo Black, as was the custom, never appeared before the
Committee.
That custom finally changed with Felix Frankfurter's nomination
in 1939. Frankfurter's opponents claimed that Frankfurter was too
radical, was too chummy with F.D.R., was Jewish, and that the next
nominee should be someone west of the Mississippi. This time the
Senate Committee invited Frankfurter to attend. At first he refused
(claiming that the press of his law teaching prevented him!), but he
relented after witnesses attacked him, his associations, his foreign
birth, and his religion. Accompanied by his lawyer, Dean Acheson,
Frankfurter read a prepared statement, which explained that he
would not express his personal views on controversial issues before the
Court. He responded to a question from Senator McCarran regarding
his patriotism by reaffirming his belief in "Americanism." The entire
episode lasted only about ninety minutes."

21.

HENRY

J.

ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS:

A POLITICAL HISTORY OF

APPOINT·

MENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 193-94 (2d ed. 1985).
22.
WILLIAM C. BURRIS, DUTY AND THE LAW: JUDGE JOH!\ J_ PARKER Al'D THE CoNSTITU-

TION 84-85 (1987).

23. See Nomination of Felix Frankfurter to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., Jst Sess.
(1939) (response of felix frankfurter); see a/so L!VA BAKER, fELIX fRANKFURTER 208-10
(1969).
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After Frankfurter's appearance, all other nominees, except for
Sherman Minton, followed suit. When Minton, whom Truman nominated in 1949, refused to appear before the Committee, some Senators criticized his refusal. There was an attempt to recommit his nomination to the Committee, but it failed, forty-five to twenty-one. 24
Nowadays, it would be unheard of for the nominee to refuse to appear
and to be questioned in person.
To bolster their position with the Senate, Presidents began, in
1948, a new tradition: seeking the advice of the American Bar Association on Supreme Court appointments. Four years after that, President Eisenhower began the regular practice of sending nearly every
federal judicial appointment to the ABA's Standing .Committee on the
Federal Judiciary. That Committee-again, until recently-normally
approved the nominees. In 1970, for example, the ABA approved G.
Harrold Carswell of the Fifth Circuit, who was widely accused not
only of mediocrity but also of racism." The Senate rejected Carswell,
although Lawrence Walsh, then the Chair of the ABA Standing
Committee on the Federal Judiciary (and later, the Independent Prosecutor in the Iran-Contra affair) defended the ABA's
recommendation. 26
More recently some commentators have accused the ABA of
politicizing the process in a way that is unfavorable to politically incorrect nominees, but the present chair of the ABA Standing Committee expects that friction will continue even under a Democratic
president. 27 Under President Clinton, the ABA Standing Committee
has continued its role of evaluating judicial appointments. In fact, because of the increased number of appointments, the Board of Governors, at the ABA midyear meeting in February 1994, increased the
Standing Committee's budget twenty-five percent, to $250,000. 28
An even more recent innovation in the confirmation process is the
nominee's private "courtesy call." Only since the 1970s has it been
the norm for Supreme Court nominees to pay courtesy calls on selected Senators, moving from office to office. Because the meetings are

24. Freund, supra note 15, at 1161.
25. In 1948, Carswell gave a speech advocating racism. In 1956, he was one of the incorpo·
raton; who converted a public golf course into a private one so that it could remain racially segregated. At his confirmation hearings, he denied that he had ::.een these incorporation documents
since 1956. Later, press reports revealed that he had seen the documents on the eve of his confirmation hearings and that the ABA Judicial Selection Committee had asked him questions about
them. RICHARD HARRIS, DECISION 18-43 ( 1971 ); Totenberg, supra note 16, at 1217.
26. Lawrence E. Walsh, Selection of Supreme Court Justices, 56 A.B.A. J. 555-60 (1970).
27. See The ABA Role in the Judicial Nomination Process: Hearings Before rhe Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, JOist Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); Clinton Camp's Bid to Fill Judgeships
Has ABA Expanding Its Resources, CHAMPA!GN~URBANA NEWS GAZETTE, Feb. 7, 1994, at A7
(quoting Robert P. Watkins, Chairman, ABA Standing Committee).
28. Clinton Camp's Bid to Fill Judgeships Has ABA Expanding Its Resources, CHAMPAIGN-URBANA NEWS GAZETTE, feb. 7, !994, at A7.
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held in private, there is no record of what is said, or promised, or
alleged to have been said or promised?• A candidate who nowadays
refused to engage in such private meetings would put the nomination
at risk, although the private nature of such meetings eliminates the
important check of public scrutiny.
Amazingly, even the practice of allowing radio microphones or
television cameras is a recent innovation. It was not until 1981, with
the confirmation of the first woman on the Court, that the Senate
finally allowed radio and television to record the event. Before that,
the public could read about the nominee but could never hear her
words or see her testimony 30
Over the years, one of the few constants in the nomination process has been the fact that the President does not formally consult
with the Senate, as a body, prior to his announcement, even though
the Constitution states that the President "shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Judges
of the supreme Court .... " 31 That same clause of the Constitution
also provides that the President shall make treaties "by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate . . . ." 32 Just as Presidents have
not consulted with the Senate prior to making treaties, they have not
followed the practice of consulting with the Senate prior to announcing their Supreme Court nominees. President Washington did consult
with the Senate (which was a much smaller body at the time) while
he was in the process of negotiating an Indian Treaty, but he found
the experience so frustrating that he vowed never to do it again, a
promise that he and subsequent Presidents have kept. 33
Over the last two centuries, there have been important changes in
the selection process, the questions asked of nominees, the role of geographic diversity, the type of hearing that the Senate Committee conducts, and the media's coverage of the hearing. What was aberrational is now commonplace.
For good or ill, the trend in modern times is for the Senate and
the media to become more involved in the nomination process. 34 One

29. See Car! Marcy, Nominees Shouldn't Pay Courtesy Calls on Senators, N.Y. TIMES.
JULY 29. 1981, at 23; see also Judge O'Connor Talks with Potential Critics, N.Y. TIMES, July 18,
1981, at 24; Mrs. O'Connor Makes the Scene, N.Y TIMES, July 19, 1981, § IV, at 4.
30. Totenberg, supra note 16, at 1213 & n.l (referring to telephone interview with a member of the Senate Judiciary staff).
31. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 2.
32. !d.
33. EOWARD S. CORWI:-.1, THE PRESIDENT· OFFICE AND POWERS: 1787-1984, at 238-40
(Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th rev. ed. 1984); l RoTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 2, § 6.1, at
487-88.
34. At least one respected commentator has recently urged the Senate to take an even more
active role and add "more politics-especially more racial politics··--to the judicial selection process . . . . " W. William Hodes, The Overtly "Political" Character of the Advise and Consent
Function: Offsetting the Presidential Veto with Senatorial Rejection, 7 Sr. JOHN's J. LEGAL COM-
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cannot explain this tendency by assuming that the Senate's increased
role is a function of the fact that the Republicans have often controlled the presidency in recent years while the Democrats have usually controlled the Senate. The change in the nature of the confirmation process began during F.D.R.'s presidency and has continued
unabated under both Republican and Democratic presidents.
The increased public scrutiny may encourage the nomination of
relative unknowns to the Court because there is less of a paper trail
that might draw questions. Although weak Presidents have always
found it politic to nominate compromise or unknown candidates, the
creation of a confirmation hearing as a media event may encourage
such action. In addition, some first-class nominees may refuse to be
considered because they do not wish to endure the gauntlet of being
subjected to unfair flyspecking of one's career. And a president, particularly a weak one, may refuse to nominate some candidates because
that president does not wish to take a risk with those who may be the
object of various rumors of long past events. That the rumors may
prove to be false is relevant but not conclusive.
However the process for approving nominees changes, we should
realize that the Senate does not choose a new Justice for today, tomorrow, or even for next year. For example, Souter, when Bush chose
him, was the same age (fifty) as Brennan was when Eisenhower selected him." If Souter's tenure on the Court is as long as Brennan's,
he will be deciding cases in 2024. Although Holmes was sixty-one
years old when Theodore Roosevelt appointed him to the Court in
1902, he sat for thirty years.
To the extent that the confirmation process tries to determine
how the nominee will vote in particular cases, it is focusing on an
issue that cannot really be answered. We do not know what the major
legal questions will be ten years from now, much less thirty years.
Nor do we know what the liberal or conservative answers to those
questions will be. However, if the more active confirmation process
focuses on the nominee's integrity, intellectual ability, and good judgment, it may produce better Justices. A more public confirmation process does not preclude that focus.

MENT 109, 123 (1991). Contra, e.g., Bruce Fein, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102

HARV L. REV. 672 (1989).
35. President Bush appointed Souter in July of !990. Maureen Dowd, Souter, New Hampshire Judge; Named by Bush for High Court; No 'Litmus Test,' President Says, N.Y TIMES, July
24, 1990, at AI. Souter turned 51 in September of 1990, and joined the Court in October of that
year.

